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press, falls below a high standard of business ethics and completely vitiates
the goals of the rule.**
STEPHEN C. UNSINO
Trade Regulation—Administrative Law—All Writs Act—Power of
Court of Appeals to Issue Preliminary Injunction upon Petition of
Federal Trade Commission.—FTC v. Dean Foods Co.'—The Federal
Trade Commission petitioned the Seventh Circuit to enjoin temporarily the
consummation of a merger between the respondents, Dean Foods Company
and Bowman Dairy Products. The Commission had issued a complaint
against the respondents under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 2
 and Section 5
of the FTC Act,a but no hearing had been held on the complaint.* The
Commission applied for the preliminary injunction on the grounds that it
was "probable" that the proposed merger would be found illegal, and that
upon consummation of the merger, Bowman would lose its identity as a
separate enterprise and the two companies could not then be effectively
restored to their original status.* The Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition
on the basis that the FTC had no authority to institute proceedings for
temporary relief in the court of appeals.° The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and then, in a 5-4 decision, reversed and remanded.? HELD•
The court of appeals has the authority to grant a preliminary injunction
against the consummation of a merger that will probably be found illegal,
and the FTC has the authority to apply to the court of appeals for such
preliminary relief. The court of appeals derives its power to grant injunctive
relief from the All Writs Acts The Commission has the "incidental power"
to petition the court of appeals for injunctive relief under the All Writs Act
41 The SEC has recently expressed great concern over the fact that, despite com-
pliance with strict disclosure standards, corporate insiders are able to trade on the basis
of material information well before it has had time to be adequately disseminated to
the public. This, it is felt, "raises serious questions of law and propriety." Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 17, 1966, p. 2, col. 2 (quoting SEC Chairman M. F. Cohen).
1 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
2 As amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. 	 18 (1964).
As amended, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45 (1964).
4 Normally, under the procedures of the FTC, a complaint is issued against parties
whose conduct is believed to be in violation of the Clayton Act, a hearing is held on
the complaint, and a "cease and desist" order is issued if a violation is found at the
hearing. See FTC Enforcement and Procedure, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 9574 (1966). This
is the only way the FTC itself can prevent a merger.
5 Under the terms of the merger, Dean was to acquire all of Bowman's dairy opera-
tions, which Dean was to consolidate into its own. Bowman was to cease to be a dairy
business and was to take the form of an investment fund with the name "Bowfund Cor-
poration." The assets of the fund were to be the cash and securities excepted from the
sale of the assets to Dean. Brief for Petitioner, p. 8.
8 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1966).
1 On remand the Seventh Circuit granted the injunction. No. 15493, 7th Cir., July
18, 1966. Subsequently, the FTC ruled that the merger was illegal. 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
II 17,765 (1966).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
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since it has been entrusted with the enforcement of the Clayton Act. The
Court further stated that the failure of Congress to enact legislation ex-
pressly granting the FTC power to petition for preliminary injunctive
relief did not imply that this power did not already exist.
Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the dissenters, labeled the decision of the
Court as "totally novel" and unsupported by any prior Supreme Court de-
cision, "either specifically or directly, or by principle or analogy." He argued
that the Clayton Act expressly vests the power to grant preliminary relief in
the district courts and the power to invoke such relief in the United States
attorneys. Further, Congress by design did not give these powers to the
court of appeals or to the FTC. Both the Commission and Congress have
implicitly recognized that no such powers have been granted. 9
Prior to the ruling in Dean, there was a conflict among the circuits as to
their authority to enjoin temporarily the consummation of a suspect merger
upon petition by an agency charged with enforcing the Clayton Act. The
Ninth Circuit upheld this authority in Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Transamerica Corp.," while the Second Circuit specifically denied
any such authority in FTC v. International Paper Co.11 There was also
considerable question within the FTC itself as to its authority to seek
prehearing relief in suspect merger cases 12
When the Supreme Court in Dean finally upheld the power of the court
of appeals to issue injunctions to preserve the status quo, its decision was
not based upon authority from the Clayton Act, but rather on the authority
of the All Writs Act. This act provides, inter alia, that "the Supreme Court
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law."13 This use of the All Writs Act raises two
immediate questions: (1) does a court of appeals act "in aid of [its ap-
pellate] jurisdiction" at the prehearing stages of an administrative pro-
ceeding? and, (2) is an injunction to preserve the status quo, under the
facts in Dean, a writ that is "agreeable to the usages and principles of law"?
The first question actually concerns when an appellate court's jurisdic-
tion arises so that it may issue writs in aid thereof. The classical theory is
9 In 1956 the Commission submitted to the 84th Congress legislation that would
amend the Clayton Act to empower the Commission to "bring suit in a district court
of the United States . . . to prevent and restrain violation of section 7 of this Act."
Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, at 29-30 (1956). Although the Commission's power was
seriously questioned at these hearings, Congress neither enacted nor rejected this or
subsequent proposals. The Court has traditionally held that to interpret congressional
nonaction is to "venture into speculative unrealities." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 120 (1940).
la 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1950).
11 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956), 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1297 (1957). "With all due re-
spect to our brethren of the Ninth Circuit, we are ... constrained to disagree with the
conclusion arrived at in the Transamerica case." Id. at 374.
12 See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. 45 (1958).
la 28 U.S.C. 	 1651(a) (1964).
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that "appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies some judicial determination,
some judgment, decree, or order of an inferior tribunal, from which an appeal
has been taken."“ This jurisdictional theory, however, has now been super-
seded by several decisions which have held that appellate jurisdiction arises
with the "existence of a right to review ... and not the prior exercise of that
right."19 According to the latter theory, the appellate court's right to review
proceedings arises as soon as the suit has been instituted below."° This
broader concept of appellate jurisdiction does not require an appeal to be
pending for a court of appeals to issue a writ "in aid of [its appellate]
jurisdiction." 12 One state court has classified this power of appellate courts
to issue pre-appeal original writs as an inherent power necessary to preserve
the res of the litigation and the status quo of the parties?' The Court in
Dean used this broader concept to grant the court of appeals jurisdiction
to issue a writ at the prehearing stage of an FTC administrative proceeding.
Appellate jurisdiction was held to arise even before an adjudication by a
lower tribunal.
To answer the second question, *whether the use of an injunction in
Dean is in itself "agreeable to the usages and principles of law," it may be
helpful to look at the development and previous use of the All Writs Act.
The present form of the act as stated in the Judicial Code of 1948 is a
combination of three different statutes dating as far back as the Judiciary
Act of 1789 19 These include the original All Writs Statute of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,2° a statute involving prohibition and mandamus2 ' (also of the
1789 Judiciary Act), and a later statute involving writs of ne exeat. 29 The
present form of the act makes "all writs," including mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, injunction, and the auxiliary writ of habeas corpus, available to a
federal court when "necessary or appropriate" in aid of its jurisdiction. 23
The more common writs issued under the authority of the act have been
those of mandamus and prohibition, 24 but injunctions to preserve the status
quo have also been issued pursuant to the act. 22 Although no reported case,
other than Transamerica, has been found in which a court of appeals issued
14 The Alicia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571, 573 (1868).
15 Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Morris, 132 Fed. 945, 955 (8th Cir. 1904). Accord,
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Transamerica Corp., supra note 10, at 315.
16 Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Morris, supra note 15, at 953.
17 Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 246 (1932); McClellan v. Carland, 217
U.S. 268, 280 (1910); Whittel v. Roche, 88 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1937).
18 Finlen v. Heinze, 27 Mont. 107, 119, 69 Pac. 829, 833 (1902).
16 6 Moore, Federal Practice If 54.10[1], at 59 (2d ed. 1965).
20 Rev. Stat. § 716 (1875).
21 Rev. Stat. § 688 (1875).
22 Rev. Stat. § 717 (1875).
23 6 Moore, op. cit. supra note 19, ¶ 54.10[2], at 61-62.
24 Ibid. Also, the cases cited in Dean as examples of the use of writs in aid of
appellate jurisdiction do in fact demonstrate that the most common writ is that of
mandamus directed to an inferior court to remove an obstruction to an appeal. See
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943); Ex parte Bradstreet, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 634 (1833); Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 188 (1831).




an injunction to preserve the status quo," its authority to do so in ap-
propriate circumstances has been recognized. 27 In addition, the district
court has been directed to issue such an injunction when the appellate
court has declined to do so." District courts have often issued such injunc-
tions, relying on their inherent authority to protect their jurisdiction."
Thus, it can scarcely be denied that an injunction to preserve the status quo
is a writ "agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Once it was
assumed that the res of the litigation was about to disappear, the use of an
injunction in Dean to preserve the res became "agreeable to the usages and
principles of law."
The Court cites two cases to illustrate the appropriateness of invoking
the All Writs Act under the facts in Dean: Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern
Ry.3° and Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.31 As
Justice Fortas emphasized in his opinion for the dissent in Dean, neither
case is exactly on point.
In Arrow, a petition was filed in a federal district court by a private
transportation company to enjoin the proposed rate reductions of one of its
competitors. The injunction was denied, however, on the grounds that the
Interstate Commerce Commission had been granted the exclusive power to
suspend rates, and that the federal courts therefore lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's opinion (affirming) only recognized in a
footnote a court's power to preserve the status quo by injunction:
Thus we do not reflect in any way upon decisions which have
recognized a limited judicial power to preserve the court's jurisdic-
tion or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an
agency's action through the prescribed statutory channels . . . .
Such power has been deemed merely incidental to the courts' ju-
risdiction to review final agency action. 32
In Whitney, while an appeal from a Federal Reserve Board decision
approving a new federal bank was pending, several state banks sought to
enjoin the Comptroller of Currency from issuing the necessary certificate.
A federal district court granted the injunction and the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed." The Supreme Court reversed on the theory that primary jurisdic-
tion was in the Federal Reserve Board and not in the district court. The
Court also recognized the power of the court of appeals to protect its
26 But see Public Util. Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242, 251-54 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), where an appendix to the court's opinion gives the text of such an injunction
which the court had previously issued. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(g).
27 E.g., Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco, 310 F.2d 632, 634 (6th Cir. 1962). See
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1942).
28 Public Util. Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., supra note 26, at 250.
20 E.g., Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d 830, 831
(6th Cir. 1964).
30 372 U.S. 658 (1963).
81 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
32 372 U.S. at 671 n.22.
33 323 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1963).
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jurisdiction by injunction both while considering the appeal from the Board's
action and in the event of a remand to the Board.
The fact that in Whitney a petition for review had been filed prior to
an injunction highlights the distinctions between Whitney and Dean. In
Dean, no petition for review of an administrative proceeding had been filed
and, in fact, no administrative proceeding had yet been held. Furthermore,
in both Arrow and Whitney, original injunctions were first sought in district
courts, not the court of appeals. Therefore, neither case can be cited as
authority for an appellate court's power to issue original writs prior to an
appeal. Both cases, however, provide authority for the proposition that an
appellate court may issue injunctions to preserve the status quo when that
court has jurisdiction to review an administrative proceeding.34 If an ap-
pellate court's jurisdiction arises even before adjudication by the inferior
tribunal, it therefore follows that the court of appeals does have power to
enjoin suspect mergers at the request of the FTC even though no adminis-
trative hearing has been held.
There still remains, however, the question of whether Sections 15 and
16 of the Clayton Act35 have impliedly amended the All Writs Act to
prohibit its application when the FTC is the petitioner. Section 15 of the
Clayton Act provides that:
The several district courts of the United States are invested
with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this Act,
and it shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys, in
their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations.
Section 16 further provides aggrieved private parties the right to seek
preliminary injunctive relief in the district courts if their interests are
threatened by a merger suspected of violating the Clayton Act. Nowhere in
the Clayton Act is the FTC given any authority to seek preliminary in-
junctive relief. It can be argued, therefore, that the express scheme of relief
set forth in sections 15 and 16, and the exclusion of the FTC from this
scheme, imply a congressional intent to restrict the FTC and the circuit
courts from respectively seeking and providing temporary injunctions to
preserve the status quo. This was the theory adopted by the Second Circuit
in FTC v. International Paper Co."
The Court in Dean could have easily found such a congressional scheme
in the Clayton Act. This would have been analogous to the Court finding,
as it often has, a congressional scheme in an area of federal legislation to
restrict the power in that area to federal agencies, as opposed to the separate
84 In Arrow, this proposition appears to be clearly dictum, but it is arguable that in
Whitney it is part of the ratio decidendi.
35 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 26 (1964).
36 Supra note 11. The court stated that "since the pattern of enforcement adopted
by the Congress in the Clayton Act makes clear that the Commission was not intended
to have such authority, the 'all writs' section cannot be invoked to circumvent this




 This is the doctrine commonly known as federal preemption.
Finding a scheme to restrict powers in Dean differs from finding a general
scheme of federal preemption in that the former concerns the division of
power between federal agencies and the latter concerns the division of
power between federal agencies and the states. Also, federal preemption
decisions involve the complex question of federalism." In Dean, however,
there was no such constitutional issue. It should follow that a "preemption"
decision in Dean would have been easier to make than the federal preemp-
tion decisions which the Court has often made. Furthermore, even with the
complex constitutional issues involved, the Court has not hesitated in finding
federal preemption in the absence of an explicit congressional intent. 39
For example, the Court has interpreted Section 10(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act4° as giving to the National Labor Relations Board exclusive
power to hear and decide all cases involving unfair practices under the
act." On its face, section 10(a) no more grants the NLRB exclusive power
to hear cases than Section 15 of the Clayton Act grants the Justice Depart-
ment exclusive power to seek injunctive relief. 42
The Court, by not construing Sections 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act
to bar the FTC from seeking injunctions, has apparently concluded that there
was an unintentional gap in the enforcement provisions of the act, although
the Court made no direct statement in its opinion to that effect. The FTC and
the Justice Department have been given concurrent power to enforce the
Clayton Act.43 However, since the FTC lacked power on the face of the
Clayton Act to obtain preliminary injunctions, its authority, prior to Dean,
was actually inferior to that of the Justice Department. Upon finding a
"probable" violation of section 7, the FTC could only request the Justice
Department to seek a preliminary injunction under section 15, and this would
result in certain problems, as set forth by the Antitrust Subcommittee of
the House Committee on the Judiciary:
[C] areful scrutiny of the language of section 15 of the Clayton
Act empowering the Attorney General to seek injunctions reveals
37 See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1963). See generally Petro,
Federal Pre-Emption—A Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 691 (1958).
83 See generally Flynn, Federalism and State Antitrust Regulation 109-38 (1954).
39 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See Petro, supra note 37, at 694.
40 As amended, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
41 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Guss v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
42 Section 10(a) provides that "the Board is empowered to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce."
61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). Compare Arrow Transp. Co. v. South-
ern Ry., supra note 30 (ICC has exclusive power to pass on the legality of proposed
transportation rates); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., supra
note 31 (Federal Reserve Board has the exclusive power to pass on the formation of
bank holding companies).
43 Clayton Act ¢§ 11, 15, 38 Stat. 734, 736 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25
(1964); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d
346, 352 (3d. Cir. 1964).
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that its provisions are not sufficient to carry out the intent of
Congress in amended section 7. Under the provisions of section 15,
if the Attorney General were successful in obtaining an injunction
from a district court in aid of the Federal Trade Commission, the
court itself would be required to "proceed, as soon as may be, to
the hearing and determination of the case." Thus, upon the obtain-
ing of a district court injunction, the administrative proceeding
before the Federal Trade Commission would be at an end and the
Commission would no longer have any power to hear and determine
the case. This would defeat the statutory intent expressed in sec-
tions 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act of having the Federal Trade Com-
mission hear and decide merger cases.44
Under this interpretation of section 15, the FTC would be deprived of jur-
isdiction in a large number of merger cases. The Court's use of the All
Writs Act to correct this gap indicates a determination that Congress' intent
was to give the FTC full power to enforce the Clayton Act." Providing the
FTC with this full power, however, has posed some new problems.
First, there is the question of whether the Commission will be able to
conduct an objective administrative hearing on the merits of a case after
it has argued for an injunction on the basis that the proposed merger will
"probably" be found illegal. Although this problem does not appear to
be as great a threat to the equitable administration of the Clayton Act
as Mr. Justice Fortas would argue, it is a problem that is inherent in the
FTC's new power because of the Commission's nature as an administrative
agency. As an agency, the FTC investigates, prosecutes, and rules on
suspected violations of the Clayton Act." Although these activities are
carried on within different divisions of the Commission,'" it is difficult for
one arm of the Commission to ignore what another arm has done. However,
there are certain provisions within the FTC rules which would provide at
least some assurance of a fair hearing after a preliminary injunction had
been issued.
The Commission has a separate office of hearing examiners whose
members are involved in neither the investigating nor prosecuting activities
of the Commission." It is their duty to conduct "fair and impartial" hear-
44 H.R. Rep. No. 1889, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1956). See note 9 supra.
45 This theory is supported by the fact that the court of appeals, by issuing an
injunction to preserve the status quo at the prehearing stage of an FTC proceeding,
acts not only in aid of its own jurisdiction but also in aid of the FTC's jurisdiction.
The res of the litigation has also been preserved to allow effective enforcement of a
probable FTC "cease and desist" order. From the general tenor of the Dean decision,
the inference can be drawn that the Supreme Court was more interested in preserving
the res for the FTC than for the court of appeals. This would indicate that the Court
used the concept of protection of appellate jurisdiction primarily as a means of provid-
ing the FTC an effective course of action.
46 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 9555 (1966).
47 Id. II 9556.
48 Id. If 9799.08. Cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(c), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5
U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1964).
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ings on the merits of a case " Under the Commission's rules of procedure,
a party to an FTC action may file a motion seeking removal of an examiner
believed to be biased. 5° There has apparently been no procedure yet estab-
lished for exercising the Commission's new power to seek preliminary relief.
Under the Commission's present organization, the most logical office to file
a petition for preliminary relief would be the office of the General Counsel.
This office presently defends the Commission's decisions in the courts of
appea1. 53 If the FTC's new power is administered in this way, there should
at least be no personal involvement on the part of the hearing officers in a
petition for a temporary injunction brought before the court of appeals.
In any event, it should be no more difficult for the Commission to make
an objective decision after a preliminary injunction has been granted than
it is for a district court to do so.
Second, there is the question of whether a preliminary injunction may
cause the proposed merger to be abandoned, whether the merger is actually
illegal or not. For example, if a motive in the proposed merger is to gain
a tax benefit in a given time period, a delay in the consummation of the
merger may frustrate its purpose. 52 Also, if the merger is delayed, the parties
may simply lose interest. However, the problem of a merger being abandoned
because of a preliminary injunction is not unique to the type of injunction
sanctioned in Dean. This problem also exists with preliminary injunctions
granted by district courts at the request of the Justice Department or private
parties. In fact, in any preliminary injunction there is the inherent danger
that an enjoined party will suffer damages before a final determination on
the merits of the case. If it is probable that a given merger will be
abandoned because of a preliminary injunction, this result will have to be
weighed against the public and private damage that may occur if the merger
is allowed to go into effect and against the problems of divestiture 53 if the
merger is subsequently found illegal." Such an evaluation is made whenever
a preliminary injunction is sought. 55
Third, there is the question of whether the new FTC power to seek
preliminary relief will turn the courts of appeal into evidentiary tribunals.
These courts are already burdened with heavy calendars and are not
equipped to make the fact determinations necessary in preliminary injunc-
tive hearings.56 Such hearings usually involve considerable time and testi-
mony.57 Furthermore, the strict section 7 policy manifested by the Supreme
49 16 C.F.R. § 3.15(c) (Supp. 1966).
50 16 C.F.R. § 3.15(g)(2) (Supp. 1966).
51 3 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 9799.06 (1966).
52 See Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1297, 1300=01 (1957).
53 Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
54 See generally Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 391 (1965); Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
771 (1965).
55 E.g., Carpenter v. Knollwood Cemetery, 188 Fed. 856 (C.CD. Mass. 1911).
56 Cf. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 724 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
67 See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd,
320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963) (Hearing on petition from Justice Department for pre-
liminary injunction took five days and produced 800 pages of testimony.); United States
v. F.M.C. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (ND. Cal. 1963).
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Court in recent years58 is an indication that many petitions for preliminary
relief will actually be brought before the court of appeals.
A congressional remedy to this problem might be suggested. This may
take either of two legislative forms. Congress may explicitly deny to the FTC
the power to seek preliminary relief in any tribunal or, as originally re-
quested by the FTC, Congress may explicitly grant to the FTC the power to
seek preliminary relief in the district courts rather than in the courts of
appeal as per the Dean decision. Under the latter solution, injunctive
petitions would be heard before tribunals with established facilities for
handling complex fact determinations. This would avoid the extra burden
placed on the courts of appeal by the Court in Dean. Furthermore, Congress
could explicitly clarify its actual intent in Sections 15 and 16 of the Clayton
Act.
Although there may be some doubt as to whether the result in Dean
comports with congressional intent, it is consistent with the well-established
administrative law doctrine of "primary jurisdiction." That doctrine, as
stated by the Supreme Court, establishes that "in cases raising issues of fact
not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise
of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the
subject matter should not be passed over." 59 A result contrary to that reached
in Dean would have deprived the FTC of jurisdiction in any case in which
a preliminary injunction was required. In such a case, the FTC would be
forced to turn to the Justice Department, and, since the court which hears
the Justice Department's petition must then proceed to hear the case on the
merits, the FTC would have to be passed over automatically, and the applica-
tion of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would be defeated.°
Since the Court's decision in United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United
States" in 1945, the problem of primary jurisdiction has not arisen with
58 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 163
(1966).
69 Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 571, 574 (1952). See generally 3
Davis, Administrative Law §§ 19.01-.09 (1958).
60 The Commission has used this argument in its requests for legislation granting
it the right to petition for injunctions. The dialogue between Mr. Paul Rand Dixon
(then Counsel to the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee) and Mr. John W. Gwynne (then
Chairman of the FTC) at the Senate hearings in 1958 illustrates the attitude of the
Commission:
Mr. Dixon. Has the Commission ever requested the Department of Justice,
in any section 7 case, to seek an injunction in its own behalf?
Mr. Gwynne. You mean in Justice behalf ?
Mr. Dixon. No, on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission suit?
Mr. Gwynne. I do not know of any such case. The difficulty with that—
we thought of it, talked about it—the only way we could do that would be,
as I understand it, to turn the case over to Justice.
Mr. Dixon. You would surrender your jurisdiction if you did that?
Mr. Gwynne. That is right.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1958).
el 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
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respect to the FTC." In Alkali, the Supreme Court recognized the power of
the Department of Justice to institute antitrust suits in the federal courts
without initial recourse to the FTC. 63 However, this power was recognized
only as an answer to Alkali's motion to dismiss a Justice Department com-
plaint on the ground that the FTC had primary juridiction. 64 The question
has yet to be answered as to who will be granted primary jurisdiction when
the FTC issues a complaint at the same time that an action is instituted in
a district court. Dean would indicate that the Supreme Court may now favor
the FTC in such a conflict. Since the Court in Dean went out of its way in
using the All Writs Act to grant to the FTC powers equal to those of the
Justice Department, it would seem unreasonable to predict that the Court
would place the FTC in a position inferior to the Justice Department in a
primary jurisdiction fight. Furthermore, Dean required an implicit decision
on the relative powers of the FTC and the Justice Department, since Dean
effectively granted to the FTC full power to hear all merger cases within its
jurisdiction without prior recourse to the Justice Department. This same
type of decision, though in a different context, will have to be made to de-
termine whether the FTC or the district courts have primary jurisdiction.
There is no apparent reason why the Court will not again favor the FTC.
There is no doubt that the Court in Dean did show a favorable atti-
tude toward the FTC. Although there was sufficient precedent for the Court
to invoke the All Writs Act prior to an adjudication by a lower tribunal, the
Court could have easily distinguished Dean from these previous cases on the
basis of both Dean's unique fact situation and the implications of Sections
15 and 16 of the Clayton Act. The fact that the Court did not choose to
do so, but provided the FTC with more extensive power, reaffirms the strict
anti-merger policy the Court has demonstrated in recent years.
Joiscs A. CHAMPY
Trade Regulation—Concerted Refusal to Deal—Association's Exclusion
of Licensed Realtor from Listing Pool—Grillo v. Board of Realtors. 1—
Defendants in this action are a nonprofit corporation 2 and its individual
member realtors. The corporation operates a "listing pool" in the Plainfield,
New Jersey area. The "listing pool" is a system whereby any residential
62 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 19 05, at 23-24 n.1 (1958).
63 During the twenty-eight years between the enactment of the Sherman Act
and the passage of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the plenary authority and settled
practice of the Department of Justice to institute antitrust suits, without prior
proceedings by other agencies, became firmly established. A pro tanto repeal of
that authority, by conferring upon the Commission primary jurisdiction to
determine when, if at all, an antitrust suit may be appropriately brought, would
require a clear expression of that purpose by Congress.
325 U.S. at 205-06.
64 Id. at 198.
1 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (1966).
2 The defendant board is a member of the National Association of Real Estate
Boards and is affiliated with the New Jersey Association of Real Estate Boards.
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